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This article argues that all economic theory presupposes implicit politi-
cal premises, and that these affect its scientifi c conclusions. More specifi -
cally, I will argue that neoclassical economics trades the epistemic val-
ues of predictive accuracy and explanatory strength for an image of the 
capitalist economy as sustainable, which renders it unequipped to ana-
lyze its crises. Echoing Anwar Shaikh’s analysis, I will show that neo-
classical economics, by constructing idealized settings and misleading 
metrics, obscures the inherent confl icts of capital accumulation. As this 
tendency leads to an incomplete understanding of the current system, I 
will argue that neoclassical economics cannot inform effective economic 
policy. To explain the difference between epistemic and non-epistemic 
values, I will begin with a brief historical overview of the role of values 
in science. I will then, by analyzing economic metrics and the basic as-
sumption of perfect competition, proceed to show that neoclassical eco-
nomics is both empirically and logically underdetermined. Once I have 
shown there is no epistemic argument in favor of neoclassical economics, 
I will argue that this choice of theoretical framework was mandated by 
underlying political concerns. I will end by discussing the relationship 
between engaged philosophy and public policy in times of crisis.
Keywords: Social epistemology, political epistemology, philosophy 
of economics, philosophy of science, objectivity.
This is, I believe, a serious problem throughout much of 
the contemporary world: erroneous policies based in er-
roneous theorizing are compounding the economic diffi -
culties and exacerbating the social disruption and misery 
that result. (Harvey 2015: 10)
1. Introduction
As far as social sciences are concerned, economics is a unique case. 
Economics is everywhere. When economic theory goes awry, it fails to 
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predict crises and proposes policies that impair millions of lives. When 
it ignores reality, economic theory overlooks the urgency of what is now 
dubbed a climate crisis in favor of corporate interests and snubs nec-
essary institutional revisions as radical and unrealistic. If what is at 
stake is the everyday survival of millions and the future survival of 
the natural world, then the task of crafting economic policy demands 
the utmost caution. Given our current success at tackling both pov-
erty and environmental devastation, with temperatures soaring above 
the recommended maximums, and inequality, in the United States 
alone, reaching rates unseen since the Great Depression (Zucman 
2019), several questions seem central. Is neoclassical economics, with 
its models and idealizations, at all equipped to deal with these exis-
tential threats? Should policy-makers reconsider heterodox economic 
approaches, browsing their toolkits for responses to pressing issues? 
Do the issues of welfare economics and climate policy require a new 
attitude towards the ethics of policy making, and where, if anywhere, 
does that place the ethical foundations of economic theory? Before an-
swering these questions, we might want to explore how neoclassical 
economics rose to become the present orthodoxy. We might wonder, for 
starters, whether the reasons behind this theory choice were strictly 
scientifi c. Did neoclassical economics offer shrewder predictions and a 
simpler explanatory framework than its competitors? Maybe its models 
painted a particularly precise image of real economic interactions? Did 
competing theoretical approaches, deprived of the neoclassical vocabu-
lary, fail to reach basic economic conclusions? If the rationale behind 
choosing neoclassical economics was not epistemic, and I will proceed 
to show that it was not, we will need to fi nd a way to explain it without 
resorting to empty talk of ideology.
My central claim is that all economic theory presupposes implicit 
political premises, and that these determine its scientifi c conclusions. 
Closer to the point, I will argue that neoclassical economics trades pre-
dictive accuracy and explanatory strength for an image of the capitalist 
economy as fundamentally sustainable, which renders it ill-equipped to 
analyze its crises. At the most basic level, all economic theory implies 
specifi c beliefs about proper state action concerning individual wellbe-
ing. Higher up, it presupposes beliefs on what constitutes a dignifi ed 
human life, and on whether the state should have anything to do with 
the makings of such a life. Economic theories presuppose and justify 
entire economic systems. What we focus on when phrasing our theory 
determines whether an economic system will seem sustainable. Sci-
ence is about inquiry. It is about seeking answers to questions and con-
structing frameworks for making sense of those answers. As Elizabeth 
Anderson pointed out in 1995, even the most neutral theories answer 
particularly worded questions, make particular classifi cations, and opt 
for particular ways of managing brute data, and it is these choices that 
inform economic theory with most of its implicit premises (Anderson 
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1995). Impartial economic theory is merely theory whose assumptions 
have, through its prevalence in public discourse, briefl y become invis-
ible. They are, however, still there, and are, as much as ever, pliant to 
philosophical analysis.
Much like Anderson, I will argue that contextual social values are 
not a hindrance to objectivity; on the contrary, they are an essential 
element of scientifi c work, and should be handled with care. If we are to 
manage modern capitalism or to propose its corrections, we must fi rst 
understand how it works. In this task, neoclassical economics fails us 
twice. Epistemically, it fails as a framework for understanding the dy-
namics of modern capitalism. Ethically, because its premise that capi-
talism is inherently stabilizing weakens its predictive accuracy, it fails 
to inform effective policy, which, in turn, damages millions of lives.
To prove this point, I will, echoing Anwar Shaikh’s excellent analy-
sis, show that neoclassical economics offers a distorted image of real 
economic practices (Shaikh 2016). In doing so, it obscures the internal 
confl icts of capital accumulation. By constructing idealized settings 
and misleading metrics, neoclassical economics portrays capitalism’s 
cyclical products, such as economic stagnation, downward pressures 
on wages, unemployment, and fi nancial crises, as its unfortunate ab-
errations. Predictable social maladies, sidelined by the constructs of 
neoclassical economics, become diffi cult to detect before they have got-
ten out of hand. Since it, as such, informs erroneous policy, neoclassical 
economics is not only epistemically dubious but ethically problematic. 
Once the choice of neoclassical economics emerges as epistemically 
unjustifi ed, I will argue that the decision to embrace this theoretical 
framework was mandated by political concerns, interested in its ability 
to depict market capitalism as inherently sustainable. As the practi-
cal consequences of this choice will often be at odds with the ethical 
demands of policy-making—which must concern itself with poverty, 
housing, healthcare, and environmental preservation—this will lead 
us to our fi nal topic, a discussion about philosophy and public policy in 
times of crisis.
Within the next twenty pages, we will be taking a detour from epis-
temological debates about the role of values in theory choice to recent 
discussions about the applied ethics of public policy. In the fi rst section, 
I will show how Thomas Kuhn legitimized values as an aid in apprais-
ing rival theories, but limited his proposal to neutral epistemic values, 
such as predictive accuracy, coherence, and fruitfulness (Kuhn 1977). 
Continuing with Elizabeth Anderson’s argument about value-laden in-
quiry, I will attempt to clarify the distinction between epistemic and 
contextual values. Why does this matter? Why should the difference 
between epistemic and non-epistemic values at all interest us? Because 
I will, in the second section, proceed to show that the decision to em-
brace neoclassical economics was epistemically unjustifi ed and hence 
guided by another kind of motivation. Instead of tackling the whole of 
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neoclassical economics, I will illustrate my argument by way of synec-
doche, analyzing unemployment metrics, poverty limits, and the basic 
premise of perfect competition. I will close the article with a brief dis-
cussion about the relationship between philosophy and public policy.
If states want to craft effective economic policy, and we may assume 
they do, they must bring economic theory’s implicit premises to the 
surface and assess their validity. At a time marked by rising inequal-
ity, precarious labor, insecure housing, and a looming climate crisis, 
there is little room for the pretense of impartial economics. Persist-
ing with outdated poverty lines in the face of mounting disagreement 
is not an impartial decision. It is a claim about the relative weight 
of human hardship. Assessing economic health in terms of production 
and consumption while experts urge for circular economies is, rather 
than adherence with neutral scientifi c concepts, conscious insouciance 
to new research.
To sum up, my goal is to show that neoclassical economics presumes 
that capitalism is inherently stable and then builds its analyses upon 
this assumption, which makes it epistemically unfi t to predict its crises. 
As long as clinging to the neoclassical toolkit continues hampering our 
efforts to resolve pressing issues, it will remain at odds with democratic 
standards and warrant an appropriate political response. If there is 
no decisive epistemic argument in favor of neoclassical economics, and 
I will show that there is none, we are invited to explore alternative 
approaches, those more apt at curbing inequality, restraining climate 
change and building a more fully just society for all. For the time being, 
we should do what we can. This point made, we can proceed to the fi rst 
part of our discussion, a brief historical overview of values in science.
2. Values in Science: 
From Epistemic Values to Implicit Premises
The struggle to recognize the role of values in science was a lengthy 
endeavor. This reluctance was largely due to the rationalist legacy 
left by the logical positivists. Unlike contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence, which places theory choice at the heart of scientifi c inquiry, logi-
cal positivism focused on work within a fi xed research program. This 
confi nement allowed it to reduce scientifi c work to induction from gen-
eral laws, and to effectively purge science of subjectivity. According 
to positivist orthodoxy, the scientist’s role was to infer scientifi c laws 
from individual observations. And the observations themselves were, 
in turn, treated as the unproblematic starting points of inquiry. Since 
scientists made these generalizations by applying shared skills and 
procedures, methods pliant to mutual accountability, scientifi c agency 
was portrayed as an inherently rule-governed business, and subjectiv-
ity was condensed to the necessary minimum. In Carnap’s view, values 
were a thing of emotion and personal preference, and, as such, entirely 
foreign to the language of science (Carnap 1959).
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Although this rationalist image of science was surprisingly durable, 
it had one fatal fl aw: it bore little resemblance to the way science—a 
cooperative project encompassing thousands of fallible individuals—is 
actually practiced. Thus construed, logical positivism paid little heed 
to two crucial facts. First, observation in science is theory dependent. 
Observations do not automatically turn into propositions: we are the 
ones who, with the aid of a chosen vocabulary, must render them intel-
ligible. An observed particle does not instantly manifest as an electron; 
we must fi rst recognize it as such. It is solely by way of theory we can 
communicate our fi ndings to others. Because we will interpret all ob-
servations in the language of our chosen theoretical framework, theory 
choice is not a provisional one-off affair but the starting point of all 
further inquiry. Second, scientifi c theories are underdetermined by the 
available evidence. In other words, there is no direct logical necessity 
between our observations and the chosen theory.
When faced with the problem of choosing one among competing 
theories, Carnap invoked the famous distinction between “internal” 
scientifi c questions, which can be answered within a given theoretical 
framework, and “external” questions, which concern the legitimacy of 
the framework itself (Carnap 1950). The internal questions of science 
were to be resolved, unsurprisingly, by logical induction from laws. 
However, when wondering whether a given research program suits our 
purposes, we could appeal to pragmatic criteria such as “fruitfulness” 
or “effi ciency.” These criteria were, of course, even if logical positiv-
ists did not yet recognize them as such, epistemic values. And theory-
choice, which Carnap identifi ed as “external” to science, was soon rec-
ognized as the most central of its activities: the choice of the framework 
which would inform the rest of our scientifi c agency.
It was Thomas Kuhn who, in his essay “Objectivity, Value Judg-
ment, and Theory Choice,” offi cially introduced values to science (Kuhn 
1977). The question Kuhn sought to answer was how we choose be-
tween equally appealing theories that account for the same empirical 
data. Historically speaking, scientifi c theories are seldom singularly 
determined by evidence: empirical fi ndings fi t snugly in different ex-
planatory frameworks, the same sets of facts give way to different 
readings, and rival scientists offer equally tempting interpretations. 
Thus, when faced with several equally viable theories, none of which is 
decided by brute evidence, we must, if we are to make a choice, resort 
to something other than the evidence at hand. This point is precisely 
where values come into play. According to Kuhn, we should then allow 
for a dose a subjectivity, evaluating the theories in line with a specifi c 
set of epistemic values and choosing those best suited to our respective 
research program. Kuhn’s original scientifi c values were, as their name 
would have it, distinctly epistemic: they were meant to promote the 
epistemic quality of our scientifi c conclusions.
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The upshot here is that scientifi c theories are often both logically 
and empirically underdetermined. Theory choice can thus seem like 
an arbitrary affair. Since we cannot fully justify our selection of either 
theory by referring to the available data, the fact it was more appeal-
ing than its competitor must lie in some external source of merit. Kuhn 
proposed fi ve such epistemic values: predictive accuracy, internal co-
herence, external consistency, unifying power, and fertility (Kuhn 
1977: 322). It is entirely clear why a physician researching vaccines 
might prioritize a more accurate theory over one that is, albeit greater 
in scope, more vulnerable to error. A theoretical physicist, whose fi eld 
does not touch upon actual human lives, might, on the other hand, 
attribute greater weight to fertility, a theory’s ability to overcome dif-
fi culties and stimulate further scientifi c research.
It is essential to note the extent to which Kuhn’s values are already 
profoundly social. In employing different epistemic values, scientists 
must refl ect upon the social confi guration of their discipline and the 
social role of its scientifi c products. When evidence does not suffi ce, 
we fi ll it in with our metaphysical assumptions and practical inter-
ests. Is ours a branch that, as its results affect living human beings, 
must prevent errors and prioritize accuracy over loftier concerns? Are 
we dealing with a theoretical domain that profi ts from continuous dis-
agreement and fruitful debate? If our scientifi c fi eld partakes in policy-
making, should it value correct predictions above thorough explana-
tions? Simply put, when choosing our theory, we fi rst ask what it is 
for. We ask what purposes it serves and what questions it is trying to 
answer. Inquiry is always driven by certain goals and interests. What 
Kuhn showed, albeit obliquely, was that theory choice inherently in-
volves social factors, and that values cannot be purged from real scien-
tifi c work. Furthermore, Kuhn saw that different scientists, guided by 
different practical interests, will attribute different weights to different 
epistemic values. Consider the following passage:
The criteria of [theory] choice function not as rules, which determine choice, 
but as values which infl uence it. Two men deeply committed to the same 
values may nevertheless, in particular situations, make different choices, 
as in fact they do. (Kuhn 1977: 324) 
However, back in the seventies, the realization that these values were 
social was not yet fully present. Even philosophers amicable of value-
laden inquiry, such as Kuhn, tended to include a telling disclaimer: 
they would only speak of values in the natural sciences, where it was 
easier to portray them as strictly epistemic. In his eponymous essay 
on values in science, Ernan McMullin drew a sharp line between epis-
temic and non-epistemic values, rooting the difference in the very na-
ture of science as a truth-seeking enterprise. Epistemic values seek 
to improve the epistemic quality of our theories and, ultimately, lead 
to truth. Non-epistemic values do not. What is more, McMullin envi-
sioned for the correct usage of epistemic values to cleanse (natural) sci-
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ence of social and political infl uences, which can only detract from the 
fi nal goal of our scientifi c efforts, objective truth (McMullin 1982: 20). 
The internal coherence of our theory, the fact it hangs well together, 
contributes to our quest for truth; its coherence with our political be-
liefs, on the other hand, does not. Our commitment to epistemic values 
will gradually lead to a better understanding of the world. The choice 
to indulge our ethical and political interests would only have us ignore 
all evidence inconsistent with a foreordained conclusion.
Our current topic owes far more to Elizabeth Anderson, who clari-
fi ed the scientifi c role of values as we usually know them. Anderson’s 
argument was not only that ethical and political values can play a de-
cisive role in theory choice, but that they inevitably do. Our role, then, 
is to handle them with care. Unlike Kuhn and McMullin, Anderson did 
not limit her account to the natural sciences. This decision to include 
the social sciences, where the practical interests that inform theory 
choice are harder to distinguish from the content of the theory itself, 
enabled her to articulate a more faithful image of real scientifi c work. 
In defending the notion of feminist epistemology, she showed how con-
textual values could shape inquiry without falling into the trap of par-
tial and irresponsible science. To do this, Anderson fi rst had to dispel 
a common concern: that allowing moral values in science entails an 
immediate loss of objectivity to ideological pressures. In the eyes of 
rationalist philosophy of science, any defense of value-laden inquiry 
conjures images of Lysenko’s biology, an infamous instance of totalitar-
ian thought control uninterested in producing epistemically valuable 
results. Once we allow politics and morals to guide science, the argu-
ment goes, objective standards of excellence will quickly give way to a 
negligent scientifi c practice blind to facts that do not comply with the 
desired conclusion. Bad science will then degenerate into a muddle of 
rigged conclusions, and all scientifi c progress will, with mathematical 
certainty, come to a halt.
Anderson retorted that this is a misconstruction of the way science 
works. More importantly, she showed that the line separating epis-
temic and non-epistemic values is not as clear as might have seemed. 
Since theories are usually both logically and empirically underdeter-
mined, underlying contextual values—metaphysical, ethical and politi-
cal—jump in to take their place. Anderson illustrated this with a rich 
array of historical examples:
Thus, Einstein initially appealed to thought experiments grounded in em-
piricist epistemological norms to argue for the superiority of the theory of 
relativity over classical Newtonian mechanics. (…) Functionalist explana-
tion in sociology was discredited partly because it was incompatible with 
the non-teleological metaphysical framework of modern science: for those 
who accept this framework, merely pointing out that a social phenomenon 
promotes social stability does not provide a satisfactory explanation for why 
it exists. (…) In these cases, normative considerations about the conduct of 
inquiry, normative constraints on the form of acceptable data and of satis-
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factory explanations, and normative desiderata of calculative ease proved 
to be powerful arguments for theory choice. Where the data run out, values 
legitimately step in to take up the “slack” between observation and theory. 
(Anderson 1995: 29)
Don’t these examples, though, still fall within Kuhn’s epistemic values? 
Once we look beyond the content of epistemic values and focus on the 
reasons why we choose them, the distinction between epistemic and 
contextual values becomes blurry. Simply put, the choice of epistemic 
values is motivated by contextual social concerns. And our commitment 
to specifi c values will then proceed to shape our research program. The 
predictive accuracy of our theory is not only epistemically valuable but 
helps inform good public policy. Fertility, which motivates further re-
search, looks to the future of our scientifi c community. As long as sci-
ence continues taking place among real people, working in real scien-
tifi c collectives and submitting their fi ndings to real practical purposes, 
theory choice will inevitably hinge upon contextual values. Anderson 
thus proceeds with a series of examples where contextual values moti-
vated theory choice to no epistemic detriment:
Functional explanation in sociology was discredited not just because it did 
not offer a satisfactory scheme of explanation but because, by representing 
phenomena as functional for the social order, it underplayed the signifi cance 
of social confl ict and discouraged criticism of the status quo. A humanist in-
terest in acknowledging and promoting the dignity and freedom of persons 
has infl uenced many social scientists. An emerging methodological norm 
among interpretive anthropologists is to show one’s research to the subjects 
of study and respond to their criticisms. This norm serves the moral interest 
of respecting the dignity of those one studies. (Anderson 1995: 31) 
If we conceive of the aims of science as at all broader than the bare 
accumulation of truths, we cannot maintain the pretense of disinter-
ested research. Most disciplines have some practical application. The 
aim of medicine is to promote health; the aim of economics, likewise, is 
to prevent crises and to inform good economic policy. Anderson’s most 
interesting theoretical innovation lies in where she located these im-
plicit practical interests. She identifi ed two places where contextual 
values enter science. First, when beginning our inquiry and wording 
our questions, we do it by considering the social purpose of our scien-
tifi c discipline. The decision what will count as an answer will depend 
on our contextual values. Second, our values will also affect the way we 
classify our data. When separating relevant and irrelevant facts and 
molding our statistical categories, we will shape them into responses to 
our initial questions. Anderson’s argument here rests on the concept of 
scientifi c signifi cance. In other words, no theory can include all imagin-
able evidence: some facts will simply not count as signifi cant. (What 
were the subjects wearing? What was the weather like?) To decide 
what evidence to feature in our theory, we will need certain criteria, 
and these criteria will depend on our practical interests.
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To guide her point home, Anderson used an example that leads 
us to our main topic. She considered American unemployment rates, 
which exclude the category of discouraged workers, people who want 
paid work but have, conceding it is futile, stopped actively seeking it 
(Anderson 1995: 45). To count as an unemployed person, one needs 
to have sought work within the last four weeks. In this reduced form, 
unemployment rates are often used to assess macroeconomic health: 
lower unemployment rates are supposed to denote a fl ourishing and 
self-stabilizing economy. The noteworthy aspect of these statistics on 
unemployment is that they are, in the relevant epistemic sense, incom-
plete. To be sure, there would be nothing spurious in offering a second 
metric, one listing only those jobless people still actively looking for 
work and, hence, still exerting downward pressure on wages. Yet posit-
ing an incomplete fi gure as the sole statistic on unemployment fails at 
its main goal: the task of informing readers about the number of jobless 
individuals in a given economy. If the fi gure included everyone who 
said they wanted a job but could not fi nd one they could have subsisted 
on, the number would be nearly double (Kudlyak 2007). In this defl ated 
form, however, unemployment metrics take on a new rhetorical func-
tion. With artifi cially decreased rates of unemployment, states can de-
pict their economic systems as more sustainable than they indeed are. 
The social malady of joblessness is thus successfully pushed aside until 
it escalates to the point it can no longer be ignored. Even if we assume 
no such deception is at play, lower unemployment rates demotivate 
policy-makers from focusing on joblessness. Incomplete theorizing thus 
leads to incomplete policy-making, and incomplete policy-making en-
trenches existing social problems.
Consider another popular economic metric, the poverty line. Before 
his appearance at the World Economic Forum’s meeting in Davos, Bill 
Gates lauded a graph which claimed that global poverty has, as a suc-
cess of global neoliberalism, declined from 94% in 1820 to just 10% 
today. Similar statements, such as those made in Steven Pinker’s En-
lightenment Now, rest upon biased readings of economic data (Pinker 
2018). These statistics are not untrue. Yet, thus presented, they do not 
offer enough background information for an adequate understanding 
of global poverty. In his retort to Gates’ diagram, anthropologist Jason 
Hickel placed the data in the appropriate context (Hickel 2019). Instead 
of a vision of linear progress, he offered an image of enforced coloniza-
tion and growing inequality, where masses of people trade rural liv-
ing for a new place within the global proletariat. First, Hickel pointed 
out that data on poverty has only been collected since 1981, rendering 
any prior measurements either sketchy or meaningless. All that these 
numbers reveal, according to Hickel, is that people used to live in non-
urban societies where very little actual money was required to survive. 
We have shifted from communities that subsisted by sharing abundant 
natural resources to a global market economy where millions of people, 
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in changed circumstances, have to struggle on microscopic amounts of 
money. Hickel then considered the poverty line itself:
But that’s not all that’s wrong here. The trend that the graph depicts is 
based on a poverty line of $1.90 (£1.44) per day, which is the equivalent 
of what $1.90 could buy in the US in 2011. It’s obscenely low by any stan-
dard, and we now have piles of evidence that people living just above this 
line have terrible levels of malnutrition and mortality. Scholars have been 
calling for a more reasonable poverty line for many years. Most agree that 
people need a minimum of about $7.40 per day to achieve basic nutrition 
and normal human life expectancy, plus a decent chance of seeing their kids 
survive their fi fth birthday. And many scholars, including Harvard econo-
mist Lant Pritchett, insist that the poverty line should be set even higher, 
at $10 to $15 per day. (Hickel 2019)
If we were to adjust the fi gures to the more conservative suggestion, 
shifting the poverty line to seven dollars (Woodward 2015), we would 
end up with an inverse image of global hardship: Hickel closed the ar-
ticle by showing that the number of people living on less than seven 
dollars a day has, rather than dropped, rocketed since the oldest data 
in 1981. So, although the initial facts were not strictly untrue, the way 
they were framed did not amount to an adequate understanding of our 
social reality. Closer to our point, it traded an accurate image of global 
inequality for an image of market capitalism as inherently stabilizing. 
Again, even if this was not a case of conscious dishonesty, such artifi -
cially soothing tales of sustainability may derail policy-makers from 
pressing social problems.
Our initial skepticism, then, was not entirely unfounded: implicit 
political premises can impede our quest for the whole truth. If we re-
fuse to acknowledge evidence that disagrees with our preordained con-
clusion, science is sure to suffer as a result. How did Anderson resolve 
this challenge? Good science, she stressed, possesses internal mecha-
nisms that guard against such miscarriages of objectivity (Anderson 
1995: 32). Standardized practices such as blind reviews, regulated 
methods, and strict regimes of mutual accountability prevent science 
from deteriorating into a state where we opt for theories whose political 
implications we hold particularly dear. Impartiality does not require 
we ask our questions pretending to be clean of all contextual interests. 
It requires that we, once we have begun our inquiry, fairly assess all 
incoming evidence, including that which might disagree with the solu-
tion we might have hoped for. Neoclassical economics, then, does not 
err when presupposing that market capitalism is self-regulating, but 
when it clings to that assumption in the face of opposing evidence. If 
the specifi c products of neoclassical economics, such as unemployment 
statistics and poverty lines, seem to forfeit completeness for a more 
sustainable image of the current system, it might be interesting to ex-
plore whether the same holds for its underlying theoretical assump-
tions. And this is the topic of our next section.
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3. Perfect Competition and the Lacking 
Epistemic Case for Neoclassical Economics
Pre-classical and classical political economics, as championed by Adam 
Smith, Karl Marx, and David Ricardo, analyzed capitalist practices 
by observing actual business behavior. Inequality, class struggle, and 
power differentials were crucial in understanding how the system 
works. And yet, this empirical approach could not be more different 
from present economic orthodoxy. Today, what we have is neoclassical 
economics, an approach focused on determining goods, outputs, and 
income distributions through laws of supply and demand. Modern neo-
classical economics, which has dominated economic discourse since the 
1980s, when the American economy, with its professed aid, recovered 
from the recession, derives its macroeconomic models from idealized 
accounts of individual behavior (Keen 2011: 35). Namely, it imagines 
individuals as fully rational and self-interested agents seeking to maxi-
mize their utility. Neoclassical models hinge on the assumption that, 
as markets are by defi nition self-stabilizing, crises can only emerge 
from excessive government interventions in the market, rather than 
from the market itself.
Why was classical political economics, a narrative discipline 
grounded in historicized empirical analyses, abandoned in favor of the 
neoclassical paradigm? What epistemic advantages did its models of-
fer? According to heterodox economist Anwar Shaikh, neoclassical eco-
nomics met the added political requirement of depicting capitalism as 
an ideal system (Shaikh 2016: 340). To maintain this image, neoclas-
sical economics shunned the former focus on production, marred with 
unequal starting positions and differential access to capital, for a fo-
cus on exchange between abstract individuals. Exchange could be por-
trayed as a moment of equality: when exchanging goods and services, 
we encounter each other as free and equal agents who can opt out of the 
transaction. Shaikh illustrates the weaknesses of neoclassical econom-
ics by criticizing its assumption of perfect competition. While political 
economists saw trade between fi rms as a struggle for dominance, neo-
classical economics refurbished it as a benevolent interaction wherein 
all agents emerge better off than when they began. This vision, accord-
ing to Shaikh, would not have been picked up had it not been for the 
changing politics.
In Shaikh’s recounting, this gilded depiction of capitalism as a sys-
tem that satisfi es the interests of all parties was a political response to 
the protracted economic crisis between 1873 and 1896, known as the 
Long Depression (Shaikh 2016: 341). As this period of entrenched eco-
nomic pessimism required a theory that would reinstate trust in capi-
talism’s functioning, Leon Walras articulated a mathematical vision 
of a perfectly competitive market (Walras 1874). What kind of theory, 
then, did these demands generate? Where classical political economy, 
concerned with actual business behavior, described aggressive compa-
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nies that monitored each other’s behavior and violently cut prices to 
achieve a market advantage, Walras offered a model of static equilib-
rium, now complete with the notions of perfect knowledge and passive 
price taking. How did Walrasian perfect competition work? In a com-
plete departure from empirical data, perfect competition presupposed 
an infi nite number of identical tiny fi rms who “operated as traders in 
specifi c auction markets managed by all-seeing auctioneers.” Shaikh 
briefl y describes Walras’ model of perfect competition:
Trading began with an announced market price that elicited buy or sell 
offers for quantities of individual commodities and labor power; this price 
being in accordance with the assumed utility-maximizing behavior of indi-
vidual participants. If the resulting quantity demanded in the given market 
price was not equal to the offered supply, the price would be appropriately 
raised or lowered. The change in price would in turn elicit a fresh round of 
buy and sell offers, until each market “groped” its way to a balance at some 
particular price. (…) In the end, the only possible state of rest was one in 
which all markets were simultaneously in balance—general equilibrium. 
(Shaikh 2016: 342)
If we observed fi rms monitoring other fi rms to gather information about 
quality and pricing, it would be an aberration from perfect competition. 
If we observed fi rms lowering prices in response to the others’ behavior, 
not to lose customers, we would, again, be dealing with imperfect com-
petition, another departure from the modeled norm. The same scenario 
would occur if we witnessed fi rms struggling to automate or reducing 
wages to cut production costs. It would soon become evident that this 
model could not survive any empirical instance of trade. When faced 
with the temporal dimension of his theory, the fact that groping takes 
time, Walras assumed that individual fi rms would only act when the 
imagined auctioneer accepted their offer. The auctioneer himself would 
only accept offers when all markets were balanced, i.e., when supply 
was perfectly proportional to demand, and when all agents were guar-
anteed to have their wants satisfi ed. It is obvious how this model pro-
duced an image of market capitalism as inherently sustainable. Yet, 
if there is no imaginary auctioneer, who is setting the prices? Nobody. 
This is an acknowledged void in neoclassical economics: since fi rms are 
passively accepting market prices, they are not setting the price, and 
neither are the customers, who use prices to determine which product 
to purchase. This is not the only theoretical corollary of price taking. 
Because fi rms do not determine prices, neoclassical economics cannot 
explain confl icts between labor and companies that bring down wages 
to cut production costs.
The theory of perfect competition, nevertheless, held steadfastly. 
Although the model was soon condemned as empirically invalid (Kue-
nne 1954) and inoperable (Walker 1987) for analyzing actual capitalist 
economies, neoclassical economics continued using perfect competition 
as a methodological and pedagogical tool. Shaikh identifi es eight tell-
ing similarities between Walras’ early model of perfect competition and 
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modern neoclassical economics (Shaikh 2016: 343). Both accounts (i) 
offer an idealized image of market capitalism as inherently sustain-
able, (ii) reduce economic phenomena to individual choices, and (iii) 
generalize the principle of scarcity from land and agriculture to all fac-
tors of production. They, moreover, (iv) transform the notion of “cost” 
to include a normal profi t range, which was entirely foreign to classical 
political economics, where fi rms often emerged, as they do in reality, as 
complete losers. More pertinent to our point, they (v) envision economic 
dynamics as an equilibrium that is automatically reinstated as soon as 
it is disturbed and (vi) assume that economic activities only take place 
in a state of equilibrium, which is a glaring deviation from empirical 
reality. Finally, they (vii) presuppose that full-employment always ob-
tains as a result of the market functioning at equilibrium and (viii) 
that all fi rms passively accept set market prices. These idealizations 
obscure the contradictions of modern capitalism—such as the tenden-
cy towards monopoly and the confl ict between labor and capital—and 
make it diffi cult to analyze its real, imperfect dynamics.
How can we relate this to Anderson’s notion of scientifi c signifi -
cance? In purging competition of its empirical constituents, such as 
fi rms observing each other’s behavior and cutting production costs, 
neoclassical economics trades an accurate image of real business be-
havior for a depiction of market capitalism as self-regulating. By posit-
ing empirical data as irrelevant and presuming its conclusion, neoclas-
sical economics limits itself to preordained results. As an alternative to 
perfect competition, Shaikh, renewing the legacy of classical political 
economics, develops the theory of real competition: competition as war-
fare, with individual fi rms seeking to undermine each other by bring-
ing down prices and the cost of production (Shaikh 2016: 259). This 
methodological choice gives him a clearer picture of the market forces 
which drive down wages, encourage automation, shape prices, and, in 
the end, produce monopolies. In comparison with Shaikh’s approach, it 
is easy to see that the theory of perfect competition was empirically un-
derdetermined. As the assumption of perfect knowledge, which would 
mean that each fi rm somehow knows what the others are doing, contra-
dicts perfect competition, Shaikh proceeds to show it is also internally 
inconsistent (Shaikh 2016: 346). If there is no epistemic argument in 
favor of perfect competition, its choice must have been mandated by 
some external source of merit. In this case, it gratifi ed contextual po-
litical values, the need to restore faith in capitalism’s sustainability. It 
succeeded at this feat by containing implicit premises—namely, that 
capitalism is self-stabilizing—most apparent in the empirical behavior 
it chose to exclude.
In 2002, aiming to show that the very foundations of neoclassical 
economics are intellectually unsound, heterodox economist Steve Keen 
came out with a thorough retort, aptly titled Debunking Economics. By 
way of basic calculus and plain language, Keen argues that neoclassi-
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cal economics cannot derive a coherent theory of consumer demand, 
that the theory of supply and demand is fundamentally fl awed, and 
that its conception of the labor market cannot explain actual social dy-
namics. After the fi nancial crash in 2008, the book reappeared for a 
second edition, now two hundred pages longer and complete with an 
urgent plea for a new economic paradigm (Keen 2011: 49). The way 
economy is taught at universities is, according to Keen, unacceptable: 
one’s initiation into economics is more akin to indoctrination than to 
education, and students, as the basic premises of their discipline, learn 
disputed claims devoid of intellectual validity. In Keen’s view, knowing 
neoclassical economics is not only useless but actively dangerous:
The most impor tant thing that the global fi nan cial cri sis has done for eco-
nomic the ory is to show that neo clas si cal eco nom ics is not merely wrong, 
but dan ger ous. Neo clas si cal eco nom ics con tributed directly to this cri sis by 
pro mot ing faith in the innate sta bil ity of a mar ket econ omy, in a man ner 
which in fact increased the ten dency to insta bil ity of the fi nan cial sys tem. 
With its false belief that all insta bil ity in the sys tem can be traced to inter-
ven tions in the mar ket, rather than the mar ket itself, it cham pi oned the 
dereg u la tion of fi nance and a dra matic increase in income inequal ity. (Keen 
2009) 
The reasons why neoclassical economics has proven so durable despite 
its epistemic shortcomings are, according to Keen, twofold. First, neo-
classical economics offers an idealized image of capitalism as a meri-
tocratic and fundamentally sustainable system, and economists choose 
to believe it. As support for the neoclassical paradigm is often equated 
with support for capitalism itself, economists less eager to identify with 
the left wing of the political spectrum feel further reluctance to ques-
tion its premises. Second, Keen argues that economic education stifl es 
critical thinking and demotivates students from casting doubt on what 
they are taught. What, then, does Keen imply? Are all neoclassical 
economists just rampant ideologues, rigging the numbers in favor of an 
oligarchic status quo? Not at all. In fact, this dogmatism is not peculiar 
of economics. It is characteristic of inquiry within an established sci-
entifi c paradigm, or within what Thomas Kuhn dubs “normal science” 
(Kuhn 1962).
In their study of scientifi c collectives, Margaret Gilbert and James 
Owen Weatherall show that a certain dose of dogmatism is not an aber-
ration from normal scientifi c behavior (Gilbert and Weatherall 2016). 
On the contrary, it is essential in maintaining group cohesion. To stay 
on good terms with their colleagues, to advance their careers, and to 
prevent the corrosive incursion of cognitive dissonance, scientists will 
seldom look into the foundations of their discipline. Instead, assuming 
all is in order, they will follow what they have been instructed and ap-
ply the learned procedures. This obstinacy sometimes entails harmful 
epistemic consequences. The task of avoiding cognitive dissonance de-
mands insouciance towards opposing evidence, and scientists are likely 
to dismiss criticisms coming from outside their group as threatening 
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or irrelevant. Critical voices within the group are likely to be silenced, 
and more inquisitive scientists will shy away from confronting their 
colleagues on contested theoretical issues. Although this kind of be-
havior does not obstruct scientifi c progress, it can impede the transi-
tion to a new paradigm. It is hardly surprising that some of the most 
lucid criticisms of neoclassical economics had to come from geographers 
(Harvey 2007) and anthropologists (Graber 2014), scientists who, be-
longing to different disciplines, were not constricted by the premises of 
their particular branch. To sum up, I have attempted to argue that the 
neoclassical notion of perfect competition sacrifi ces completeness and 
empirical adequacy for an image of market capitalism as inherently 
sustainable. Because it is both empirically and logically underdeter-
mined, its choice seems to have been mandated by contextual political 
values: namely, by the political task of depicting capitalism as funda-
mentally self-regulating. Hoping that this discussion has suffi ced to 
show that neoclassical economics is neither the only nor the best ap-
proach to our economic reality, we can now explore the relationship 
between philosophy and policy-making.
4. Conclusion: How to Craft Economic Policy
We have seen that, by presuming that capitalism is inherently sustain-
able, neoclassical economics trades accuracy and completeness for a 
contrived image of the present system. This self-imposed methodologi-
cal limitation renders it unfi t to predict economic crises and hampers 
us in detecting social problems before they have gotten out of hand. 
Now is the time to answer our introductory question. How to craft eco-
nomic policy in times of crisis and growing inequality, when a new eco-
nomic paradigm is nothing but a moralistic pedagogical proposal, and 
the orthodox approach provides no tools for managing modern capital-
ism? Finally, what is the role of engaged philosophy in guiding and 
overseeing this process? Shaikh and Keen’s critiques of the neoclassical 
paradigm take after Elizabeth Anderson’s good science: mutually ac-
countable researchers hold each other to high epistemic standards and 
scrutinize the other’s outputs, detecting intellectual weaknesses and 
demanding they be resolved. In calling for changes to the way econom-
ics is taught, Keen goes a step further, looking to the future of econom-
ics as a scientifi c discipline. As an alternative to neoclassical economics 
and standard heterodox approaches, Shaikh offers us an empirically 
grounded revival of classical political economics, a theory sensitive to 
unequal starting positions and power differentials (Shaikh 2016: 4). 
Keen, working in another tradition, gives us a fruitful methodological 
framework which, taking account of time and disequilibrium, manages 
to predict crises and model depressions (Keen 2011: 426). Although 
both economists approach their task from explicit ethical standpoints, 
they do not sacrifi ce empiricism and scientifi c standards to some pre-
ordained conclusion.
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However, while academic economics can play for time with its tran-
sition to a new scientifi c paradigm, testing different approaches and 
schools of thought, policy-makers do not enjoy this privilege. Similarly, 
unlike the lofty realm of epistemology, which benefi ts from unremitting 
debate, policy-makers cannot resolve the problem of dissenting experts 
by suspending their judgment and waiting for some calmer moment 
within economic discourse (Sosa 2010). What should we do? How can 
we, as comparative laypeople, choose the economic theory best suited 
to our social reality? According to Alvin Goldman, laypeople cannot dis-
criminate between competing experts by evaluating the esoteric con-
tent of their claims (Goldman 2001). In other words, we lack both the 
knowledge and the time needed to study the internal propositions of 
some scientifi c discipline, which renders us unequipped to assess the 
expert’s status within his branch. Policy-makers are just as unlikely to 
trudge through the margins of economic theory. What we can do, Gold-
man argues, is refer to the expert’s track record of successfully solving 
problems. Translated into the language of economic policy, we should 
favor those economic approaches which have managed to foresee crises 
and have shown a commitment to human welfare. After the fi nancial 
crash in 2008, Dutch economist Dirk Bezemer compiled a list of econo-
mists who, using heterodox methodological tools, predicted the suppos-
edly unpredictable economic crisis (Bezemer 2009). What the twelve 
cataloged economists, Steve Keen included, had in common, was an 
empirical approach to the economy, a concern with debt, and a regard 
for the relationship between the fi nancial and the real sector. As Keen 
points out, these features stand in stark opposition to neoclassical eco-
nomics, which barely accounts for fi nance and which, due to its ideal-
ized assumptions, lacks the tools to model depressions (Keen 2011: 47). 
In a recent article, Jonathan Wolff drew up the distinction between 
applied and engaged philosophy, the latter of which seeks issues of 
ethical interest and endeavors to resolve them through public policy 
(Wolff 2019). As philosophers, we have been granted the privilege of 
a life spent working through arguments, managing abstract concepts, 
justifying theories, and comparing information garnered from diverse 
sources. This fortunate position obliges us to put our tools to good use, 
applying them to unearth the implicit assumptions of modern society 
and to assess their validity. At a time marked by myriad social ail-
ments—record rates of inequality, environmental degradation, racism, 
sexism, nationalism, and imperialism—we are obliged to understand 
and counter the forces that reproduce them. Engaged philosophy is 
much like Elizabeth Anderson’s good science: conscious of its social role 
and willing to disclose its values, it addresses evidence and arguments 
with an open mind, browsing through historical lessons and studying 
policies in search of the most effective solution. Correctly understood, 
this engagement presupposes an interest in the economy, the material 
basis of all social life. Our shift towards a world where each person 
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will be able to pursue their goals and fulfi ll their potential demands 
a stable economic footing; to build it, we will need a theory that can 
grasp economic reality as it is. Neoclassical economics, in assuming 
that the current system is sustainable, presumes its foregone conclu-
sion, hampering our efforts to shape a just world. I have attempted to 
show that, in heterodox economic approaches, there are viable alterna-
tives at hand. Transitioning to a new economic paradigm will surely be 
a formidable task. Yet this is the task ahead of us.
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